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Source: *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (MARCH 1963), pp. 95-120
Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20832671
Accessed: 02-01-2016 07:47 UTC

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE MU'TAZILĪ INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR'ĀN

MAZHER-UD-DIN SIDDIQI

Before the rise of the Mu'tazilah, many religious and intellectual problems had come to surface which never had troubled the minds of the early Muslims who had been satisfied with a simple statement of the fundamental tenets of Islam and rarely, if ever, cared for their metaphysical or theological implications and whose energies had been directed to the practical implementation of Islamic ideals. The civil war between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah and the issue of arbitration between their respective claims occasioned the first theological disputes among the Muslims. In fact, there is a theory put forward by Isfrā'īnī which connects the birth of Mu'tazilism with the peace patched up between Mu'āwiyah and Ḥasan, elder brother of Ḥusayn b. 'Alī.[1]

It is difficult to say how far this theory of the origin of the Mu'tazilah is correct. Some support is lent to it by the fact that in later history the Mu'tazilah became closely associated with the 'Abbāsids and supported neither the claims of the 'Alids nor those of the Umayyads. But even if true, it does not go far to explain their theological standpoint except insofar as it adds that "their predecessors had priority over them in refuting the Christians, the Jews, the Magians, the Sabians and different groups of Zindīqs. But their incessant disputes and discussions with groups which had gone astray and their habit of appealing to reason in everything caused them to land into dangerous innovations of which a detailed account will be given later".[2]

Now, the question arises as to who were the predecessors of the Mu'tazilah, for it is from them that they inherited their theological problems and defined their standpoint in contrast with that of the other groups who either preceded them or were contemporaneous. The first theological dispute in Islam, as we stressed above, arose during the civil war between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah and the party that took it up was that of the Khawārij. Apart from other tenets which they held, their most important belief was that a person who committed a major sin was by that very commission placed outside the pale of Islam. Moreover, they held that *jihād*

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(holy war) against wrong-doers was incumbent on every true Muslim. This was the direct outcome of their belief that the enjoining of good and the forbidding of evil (*al-amr bi 'l-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*) formed the necessary duty of every Muslim. In both these respects, the Mu'tazilah shared, though in a more diluted form, the religious views of the Khawārij. With regard to this, Baghdādī says, "When the *Fitnah* (disturbance in religious or political matters) of the Azāriqah appeared in Baṣrah and Ahwāz, and people began to differ in regard to persons who committed sins on the five grounds mentioned by us. Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā' took a position different from that of all his predecessors and put forward the view that the evil-doers (*fāsiqs*) belonging to this *Ummah* were neither believers nor disbelievers and he made evil-doing (*fisq*) a stage intermediate between the two stages of disbelief and belief".[3] A little further Baghdādī says, "Then Wāṣil and 'Amr agreed with the Khawārij that the punishment of those who commit major sins is an eternity of Fire ; although they held, at the same time, that such a person was neither a *mushrik* (one who associates God with other deities) nor a disbeliever. For this reason, it was said that the Mu'tazilah formed a group of eunuchs among the Khawārij, because when the Khawārij believed that those who committed major sins, deserved eternal punishment they went on straightforwardly to declare that such people were disbelievers, while the Mu'tazilah, believing that their punishment would be eternal hell-fire, had not had the courage to declare that they were disbelievers".[4]

Similarly, the Mu'tazilah shared with the Khawārij their standpoint with respect to the duty laid upon a Muslim in the Qur'ān, with regard to the enjoining of good and the forbidding of evil (*al-amr bi 'l-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*). That this is an important duty of the Muslims has been recognised by all the groups of Muslims but opinions have differed as to the extent to which it is incumbent on the Muslims, the forms that it might assume and the means to be employed for the purpose. The Khawārij pushed this doctrine to its logical extreme and advocated armed insurrection against all authority which tolerated or encouraged things forbidden, or did not come up to their own standards of righteousness. The Mu'tazilah held a more or less similar doctrine. Ibn Ḥazm, for example, writes, "some groups from among the *Ahl al-Sunnah* and the entire body of the

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Mu'tazilah, the Khawārij and the Zaydīyah were of the opinion that the drawing of sword for enjoining good and forbidding evil was a necessary duty, when the removal of evils disapproved of by religion was not possible (in any other way). They said that if the people who had the right on their side had sufficient numerical strength to remove the evils (disapproved of by religion) and they did not despair of success, then this was a necessary duty for them, but if their numerical strength was such that because of their weakness and lack of strength, they had no hope (of success), there was a way out for them in that they were not required to change matters by their hands (that is, by the use of physical force)".[5]

Thus far the Mu'tazilite theology may be said to have been a continuation of the doctrinal view-point of the Khawārij. But they also discussed problems which the Khawārij had never raised. For example, the doctrine of free-will, that is, man's power over his own acts, did not figure in the discussions of the Khawārij, although it was implicit in their theological standpoint, for such an activist group as that of the Khawārij could hardly deny man's power over his own acts, that is, his freedom of the will. Without belief in human freedom, Khārijī insurrectionism and constant appeal to *jihād* (holy war) against those whom they considered to be unrighteous rulers, becomes meaningless. However, the Mu'tazilah, as we have said, did not inherit the problem from them. In this respect, they merely continued the teaching of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī from whom Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā', the founder of the Mu'tazilah, seceded. Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, was upholding the doctrine of man's free-will in the face of the encouragement given by the Umayyad rulers to the opposite doctrine of determinism. With regard to this issue, Ḥaṣan took his stand on the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. It may be mentioned here that Ḥaṣan al-Baṣrī wrote a letter to 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (65-85 A.H.) where "Ḥasan speaks of the 'Sunnah of the Prophet' with regard to the freedom of the will, although he admits that there exists no formal and verbal tradition from the Prophet about this matter."[6] This letter of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, apart from establishing the fact that belief in human free-will was implicit in the life-activity of early Muslims, also shows that the Umayyad rulers were interested in the propagation, among the Muslims, of the opposite doctrine of *Jabr* (Determinism). But the Mu'tazilah had other intellectual predecessors in this respect.

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These were the Qadarīyah, proper, as distinguished from the Mu'tazilah, who were lumped together with the earlier Qadarīyah, by later Muslim writers, because they shared their belief in the doctrine of man's free-will. It seems that this latter doctrine was the product of a reaction against the policy of the Umayyad rulers who disliked being held responsible for their acts and, therefore, tried to inculcate the belief that because man had no power over his own acts, he could not be held responsible for his deeds. We learn, for example, from Baghdādī that "during the days of the last survivors from among the Companions of the Prophet, there appeared the opposition led by the Qadarīyah in the matter of *Qadr* (freedom of the will) and *Istiṭā'ah* (man's capacity to act). The people who headed the movement were Ma'bad al-Jahnī (Ibn Khālid al-Jahnī of Baṣrah, who first discussed the problem of *Qadr*. He joined the revolt of Ibn Ash'ath and was killed by Ḥajjāj after the year 60 A.H.). Ghaylān of Damascus (son of Muslim al-Qibṭī) who learned his doctrine from Ma'bad, was called upon by 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz to repent and was afterwards killed by Hishām b. 'Abd al-Malik and J'ad b. Dirham (teacher of Marwān b. Muḥammad, the last of the Umayyad rulers). The latter was the first to put forward the doctrine of the *Khalq al-Qur'ān* (Createdness of the Qur'ān).[7] In continuation of the above statement, Baghdādī adds, "the last survivors of the (Prophet's) Companions like 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar, Jābir b. 'Abd Allāh, Abū Hurayrah, Ibn al-'Abbās, Anas b. Mālik, 'Abd Allāh b. 'Awfā', 'Aqabah b. 'Āmir al-Jahnī and their compeers dissociated themselves from them and left a will to their descendants that they should not offer salutations to the Qadarīyah, nor offer prayers at their funerals, nor visit them when they are sick". This last statement with regard to the social boycott of the Qadarīyah does not seem to be historically true, for if Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's above-mentioned standpoint with regard to the Prophetic *Sunnah* is correct, as no doubt it is, the Companions of the Prophet would not have reacted so sharply against a doctrine which was, after all, implicit in the faith and practice of the early Muslims. It is quite probable that this statement of Baghdādī represents a later view-point which finds expression in such *Ḥadīths* as "The Qadarīyah are Magians of this *Ummah*".

We now come to another cardinal doctrine of the Mu'tazilah, namely, their insistence on the unity of the essence and attributes

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of God, and the theory of the *Khalq al-Qur'ān* (Createdness of the Qur'ān) held by them, which had originally been propounded by Ja'd b. Dirham during the governorship of Khālid b. 'Abd Allāh in Khurāsān. All the different groups of the Mu'tazilah were agreed that the attributes of God could not be considered separate from His essence, for such separation would impair God's unity. Moreover, they believed that the Qur'ān did not exist from Eternity but was created by God in time, because the existence of the Qur'ān from Eternity would mean the existence of two co-eternals (God and the Qur'ān). In regard to the first doctrine, there is enough evidence to show that this was developed in the course of the Mu'tazilite argumentation with the dualists (*Thanawīyah*) or the Manichaeans. Ash'arī says,[8] for example, about Abu 'l-Hudhayl 'Allāf, "He (Abū 'l-Hudhayl) used to ask the dualists and would say to them: 'When you maintain about the opposition between light and darkness that it is the same as the two and that the opposition (of light to darkness) is the same as their mixture, then you should also say that their opposition is the same as (i.e. identical with) their mixture'." This and other facts establish that the Mu'tazilah in their early career were mainly engaged in refuting the Manichaeans who were secretly carrying on their missionary work under the early 'Abbāsids and show that their insistence on the absolute unity of God (for they called themselves *Ahl al-'Adl wa 'l-Tawḥīd*) must have grown out of their religious disputations with the Manichaeans, and that this took the form of abolishing all distinction between God's essence and His attributes, for such a distinction, if it is pushed to an extreme, would lead automatically to a kind of dualism in the Godhead. However, in reaching this position, the Mu'tazilah were following, not the Qur'ān as such, which mentions God's attributes with Him in a manner that leaves no doubt as to the distinction between the two, but a logic of their own which treated religious matters on a different plane. It may be mentioned in this connection that, according to Al-Ash'arī,[9] Abu al-Hudhayl derived his argument (that the knowledge of God is the same as God and so is His power) from Aristotle who said in some of his books that God is all-knowledge, all-power, all-life etc. How far Ash'arī's above remarks about Aristotle are true, we cannot say.

As far as the doctrine of *Khalq al-Qur'ān* (Createdness of the Qur'ān) is concerned, it may be presumed that this was a reaction

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against the Christian doctrine of Logos, for the Christians believed that Logos or the Word is eternal and uncreated. It is, in fact, on par with God Himself. The Mu'tazilah, probably, argued that if the Qur'ān is taken to be eternal, it would come to occupy the position of Logos in the Christian doctrine. There would, thus, be introduced in the God-head a kind of duality fatal to the Islamic creed. That they must have entered into theological discussions with the Christians of Iraq as they had discussions with the Manichaeans and the Buddhists is almost a certainty, for a large number of Christians at that time were living in Iraq.

The reaction produced by the Mu'tazilah theological standpoint in the learned circles of the Muslims is clearly reflected in the opinions of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah who says that the originated reason of man is liable to weakness inasmuch as it has been said by the Prophet, "Think over God's Creation but do not speculate about the Creator", while the Qadarīyah and the Mu'tazilah tried to understand the Divine Being by means of their faulty power of reason, until their reason became sickly and effete."[10] This seems to have been a reaction against the speculative philosophising of the Mu'tazilah and shows that the general religious thought of the Muslims was seeking some solid ground and firm anchoring point in matters of theology before venturing into empty speculations without any support from religious authority or external observation and experimentation. Moreover, Abū Ḥanīfah's work, *Kitāb al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, opens with a definition of *Tawḥīd* or God's unity in which is included belief in "the determination by God of good and evil" (والقدر خيره و شره من الله).[11] It should be noted that the determination of good and evil by God forms no part of the articles of Muslim creed as enunciated by the Qur'ān which requires Muslims only to believe in God, His Angels, His Prophets, His Books and the Day of Judgement. Therefore, the addition of this last article of belief by Imām Abū Ḥanīfah represents a reaction against the over-emphasis of the Mu'tazilah on man's free-will.

THE PROBLEM OF MAJOR SINS

We have seen that the main problem which confronted the Mu'tazilah and resulted in their secession from Ḥasan al-Baṣrī was the question of the position which ought to be assigned to those who committed major sins. The Mu'tazilī view was that they were

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neither believers nor disbelievers but occupied a position intermediate between the two.

Before the appearance of the Mu'tazilah, there were three groups of opinions with regard to those who committed major sins. The first was that of the Khawārij who maintained that those who had been guilty of major sins were disbelievers. The Murjīyah, on the other hand, held that major sins could co-exist with *Īmān* (faith), while Ḥasan al-Baṣrī held that such people were hypocrites. All were agreed that those committing major sins were *fāsiqs* (corrupt). The Khawārij, however, equated *fisq* (corruption) with disbelief. Ḥasan maintained that their *fisq* rendered them *munāfiqs* (hypocrites). Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā', on the other hand, came forward with the theory that the Qur'ān had made it clear[14] that the disbelievers should either be forced to pay the *jizyah* or, if they were polytheists, should be warred against and made prisoners (LXXII : 4). These commands, he said, did not apply to those who had been guilty of *fisq* or those who committed major sins. As regards believers, he added, the Qur'ān had commanded that a relation of love and amity should be established with them and God had promised them a rich reward in the Hereafter. Thus, the Qur'ān says, "God is the friend of those who believe" (II : 257); "And tell the believers that God had great bounties in store for them" (XXXIII : 47). On the other hand, the wrongdoers (those guilty of major sins) had been cursed and threatened with dire punishment. Thus, the Qur'ān says, "Beware there is the curse of God upon the wrong-doers" (XI : 18) and "the corrupt people are to go to hell-fire" (LXXXII : 14). Therefore, such people could not be bracketed with believers. They could not also be called *munāfiqs* (hypocrites) because the command of God with regard to a hypocrite is that if, by successfully concealing his hypocrisy, he lives like a Muslim to all outward appearance, he should be treated as such, but if he is found out, he should be asked to repent, failing which he should be killed. Therefore, the *fāsiqs* (corrupt people) cannot be treated as *munāfiqs* (hypocrites). The only way of classifying them was that they should be treated neither as disbelievers nor as believers but as occupying a stage intermediate between the two.

In conformity with this stand regarding those who were guilty of major sins, the Mu'tazilah also argued that such people would suffer from eternal punishment in hell, unless they made

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their repentance. For example, Jubbā'ī quoted the Qur'ānic verse addressed to the Jews :[15] "They (the Jews) said that fire will not touch us except for a few days. Say : have you made a compact with God about this, so that He will not go against His compact or you are saying something about God which you do not know" (II : 79) and they argued therefrom that God did not promise either to Moses or to any other Prophet after him that He would take out sinners and those who committed major sins from hell-fire, after having tormented them therein, because if he had promised them such a thing, it would not be proper for Him to deny, as He has done in the above verse, the existence of such a promise. If this is true of all the religious communities, it is also true of Muslims, for the wisdom of God in regard to promise and threat cannot differ in respect of different religious communities. Rāzī rejects the latter part of the argument as unsound, and says that this is only a claim made by Jubbā'ī which is unsupported by proof. He also says that there is a difference in saying that God made no promise to Moses to take out the wrongdoers from hell after their having undergone punishment and in saying that God informed Moses that He would not do so in future. It is certain that God made no such promise to Moses and yet He may take out the wrongdoers from hell-fire, after they had undergone sufficient punishment.

The Mu'tazilah argued also from the Qu'ānic verse immediately following the one quoted above which says, "Yes, he who acquires evil and his misdeeds encompass him, such will be the men who will burn in fire eternally." The argument ran that since the Qur'ān had made it clear that the reward of evil is an evil of the same degree, it is clear that one whose misdeeds are so enormous as to encompass him totally, will have to suffer the punishment of eternal hell-fire. Similarly, they argued[16] from the Qur'ānic verse, "He who disobeys God and His Prophet and trespasses the limits laid down by God shall be driven by him into hell-fire wherein he will remain eternally" (IV : 13). In support of this, they further pointed to the Qur'ānic verse : "He who comes before his Lord in a state of guilt, there will be for him hell in which he shall die not and he who comes as a believer who has done good works, for such there will be high ranks with Him" (XX : 73). Thus, God had made it clear, they said, that the disbeliever and the *fāsiq* (corrupt) would be punished with eternal hell-fire, while the

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believer would be rewarded with eternal bliss. Similarly, the Qur'ānic warning, "He who does this will join the sinners, for him the punishment on the Judgement Day will be doubled and He will live there in eternal disgrace" (XXV : 68) made it clear that the morally corrupt among the Muslims were like disbelievers, insofar as eternal punishment was concerned, except when the former repented, and the latter renounced their disbelief. The *Ahl al-Sunnah*, on the other hand, argued[17] from the verses of the Qur'ān promising pardon for sinners such as "He it is who accepts repentance from His creatures and pardons evils and knows what you do" (XLII : 24) ; "And thy Lord is prone to pardon people in respect of their transgressions" (XIII : 5) ; "Say, O my creatures who have been guilty of excesses, do not despair of the mercy of God. He pardons sins in their entirety" (XXXIX : 52). Another verse quoted by the *Ahl al-Sunnah* was, "I had warned you of a burning fire in which nobody roasts except He who belies and turns his back" (XCII : 13-15). The last line, they maintained, made it clear that eternal hell-fire would be the punishment of disbelievers only, who belie the word of God and His Prophets.

In order to justify their stand with regard to the eternal punishment of those who had been guilty of major sins, the Mu'tazilah had to explain away the Qur'ānic verse, "God does not pardon that He should be associated with but He pardons everything else for him whom He wants to pardon" (IV : 115). The explanation of Zamakhsharī[18] in terms of the Mu'tazilah creed is that God would pardon the person who had associated some other deity with Him, provided the person guilty of association repented and that He did not pardon whatever else there was of major sins, except when the guilty person repented. In interpreting this verse, Zamakhsharī lays stress on the words, "whomsoever He wants to (pardon)," as if the Qur'ān said, "God does not pardon *shirk* (association) for him whom He wants (not to pardon), and pardons whatever there is of other sins for those whom He wants (to pardon)." The first part of the verse refers to him, says Zamakhsharī, who does not repent, while the second part refers to the person who repents. Zamakhsharī goes on to give an example from everyday life. For instance, a person might say "the ruler does not spend even a single dīnār for one person, but he spends a heap of gold for another person, if he wishes'. This means that

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the ruler does not spend a dīnār over a person who does not deserve it, but he is prepared to spend even a heap of gold for another who is really deserving.

Rāzī refutes the above argument of Zamakhsharī and claims that in the Qur'ānic assertion that God pardons all else except association with Himself, 'all else' includes both major and minor sins, whether before or after repentance. Of course, says Rāzī, the pardoning of God in all three cases can be classified under two heads : (1) that He pardons all of it for every one (2) that He pardons all of it for some persons only. God's assertion that He pardons whatever else there is of sin except association with Himself shows that He pardons all these three things. Then His saying, "for whomsoever He wants," shows that He pardons all these three things not for all persons but for some.

Rāzī also argues against the stand taken by the Mu'tazilah with regard to intercession. He says[19] that the Muslim community is agreed on the point that the Prophet will be allowed to intercede for the Muslims on the Judgement Day and they have argued from such verses as "God is about to send thee to an exalted rank" (XVII : 78) and "Thy Lord will bestow the gift on thee so that thou shalt be pleased" (XCIII : 4). But, he adds, they disagree as to whether the Prophet's intercession will be for the believers who deserve reward or for those who, by committing major sins have rendered themselves liable to punishment. The Mu'tazilah, Rāzī adds, believe that the intercession will be for those who deserve reward and it will tend to increase their reward beyond what they strictly deserve. On the other hand, our people, Rāzī says, have taken the verse to mean that the intercession will be for those who deserve punishment, which it will tend to cancel. Rāzī brings forward the following arguments in support of this stand.

The Qur'ān refers to the words of Christ, "If thou punishest them, then they are Thy own creatures, but if Thou pardonest them, then Thou art the Powerful and the Wise." Now this intercession, on the part of Christ, may either relate to disbelievers or an obedient believer or a believer who has committed major sins, or a believer who has committed minor sins, or a believer who has committed major sins but has made his repentance or a believer, who having committed major sins, has not repented. The disbelievers are plainly excluded from this intercession. The second, third and fourth categories mentioned are also excluded, because

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it would be unreasonable on God's part to punish an obedient believer, or a believer who has committed minor sins or one who, after committing major sins, has made his repentance. Therefore, it can only relate to those who commit major sins and fail to repent. Similarly, the Qur'ān refers to Abraham's prayer, "He who follows me belongs to me but he who disobeys me, then Thou art the Pardoner, the Merciful" (XIV : 33). Again, these words cannot apply to a disbeliever who is not worthy of pardon by general consent. Similarly, they cannot apply to those who commit major sins and repent afterwards.

One of the Qur'ānic verses referred to by the Mu'tazilah in defence of their position with regard to those guilty of major sins was the verse with regard to the wilful murderer of a Muslim which says, "He who murders a believer wilfully, his punishment is hell-fire in which he shall stay eternally" (XIV : 92). Commenting on this verse of the Qur'ān, Zamakhsharī refers[20] to the remarks of Ibn 'Abbās that the repentance of a wilful murderer of a believer is unacceptable to God. He also narrates from Sufyān al-Thawrī that when the scholars were asked about this, they said that there was no repentance for such a person (meaning that his repentance was of no avail) and this, says Zamakhsharī, is based on their strict adherence to God's *Sunnah* in the matter of strictness (with regard to those who commit major sins). Otherwise, adds he, every sin could be washed off by subsequent repentance. Zamakhsharī proceeds to show that those who commit major sins shall suffer from an eternity of punishment, unless they make their repentance.

In accordance with their belief in the freedom of the human will, the Mu'tazilah sought to explain away the verses of the Qur'ān which stressed God's omnipotence in such a manner that it would leave no power in God's hands and make man a self-sufficient being. For example, Hishām bin 'Amr al-Fūṭī said that men united their hearts voluntarily and of their own power and that God did not unite men's hearts.[21] This evidently refers to the Qur'ānic verse, "Thou didst not unite their hearts but God united them" (VIII : 62). Hishām's stand involves an obvious denial of the Qur'ānic assertion of God's power. Similarly, he claimed that God does not approve of faith in the faithful and adorn their hearts therewith, though the Qur'ān says clearly, "He it is who approved of Faith in you and adorned your hearts therewith"

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(XLIX : 6). Mu'ammar and Jāḥiẓ, two leading thinkers of the Mu'tazilah, it seems, ascribed to man's inherent nature, the power to guide him to the right path or to lead him astray. This they were doing in the face of the clear Qur'ānic assertion that "God leads astray whom He wills and guides him whom He wills" (XIV : 3). Commenting on this stand of Mu'ammar and Jāḥiẓ, Ibn Ḥazm[22] says that this does not extricate them from our question as to who created the *Nafs* and further created therein the disposition necessitating these acts. It is apparent that, in referring all acts and motions to the nature of men and things, the Mu'tazilah tended to undermine religion which ascribes all things to God's will. Similarly, with regard to the Qur'ānic verse, "Say, God Thou art the owner of dominions, who givest dominion to whomsoever Thou likest, and takest away dominion from whomsoever Thou likest" (III : 25) the Mu'tazilah stand was in conformity with the general tenor of their thought. According to Rāzī, it was the opinion of Ka'abī[23] that this statement about elevation and degradation by God did not signify the exercise of Divine power by voluntary choice. It meant that God elevated those who deserved elevation and degraded those who disobeyed His commands. In support of this, Ka'abī quotes the Qur'ānic verses, "The wrong-doers cannot hope to benefit by my covenant" (II : 123) and "God preferred him above you and added to the stature of his knowledge and body." The first verse means that wrongdoers cannot hope for elevation and the second shows that when God elevates some one, He does so for some good reason. Jubbā'ī's opinion is also given by Rāzī who is reported as saying that this command is specific to just rulers and, as for unjust rulers, it is impossible that their dominion be God-given. Ka'abī's stand that the unjust is not from God seems obviously incorrect, for then we will have to suppose that there is some other authority, besides God, which confers dominion on man. Both these opinions, however, ignore the fact that while God's treatment of men and rulers cannot be arbitrary and that, while it is true that only those acquire the dominion who deserve it and those who lose it do so because they do not have the necessary competence, it is only by Divine grace that men and nations deserve and acquire dominion, so that ultimate power rests in God's hands and not those of men.

In contradistinction to the Mu'tazilah, Asha'rī and his followers reduced human freedom to the point, where it became almost an

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illusion. Ash'arī propounded the doctrine of '*Kasb*' or acquirement, according to which God creates in man the capacity from moment to moment as he acts, so that for every fresh act of man, a fresh act of creation on God's part has to come into play. Ash'arī, therefore, denies any inborn capacity in man and says that man merely acquires the ability to do a thing which is created by God.

Yet another theory of human freedom was advanced by Māturīdī[24] of Samarqand which differs from that of the Mu'tazilah but also repudiates the view of the Ash'arite school. Māturīdī says that the acts of man are God's creation and freedom (*Ikhtiyār*) has not been entrusted to man, as the Qadarīyah (Mu'tazilah) maintain. As regards the Mu'tazilī argument from the Qur'ānic verse, "He who wills, let him believe and he who wills let him disbelieve" (XVIII : 29), Māturīdī says that this is threat (*wa'īd*), not *tafwīḍ* (entrusting of power), because God says, "We have prepared a fire for the wrongdoers" (XVIII : 29) and God has also said, "God created you and whatever you do" (XXXVII : 96). If it is said why God punishes them, when He created their acts, we would reply, says Māturīdī, that reward and punishment are the result of the use which the creature makes of the act (created by God) and not of that which God creates. God rewards or punishes man for the use he makes of his capacity to do good or evil and not for the origination of that capacity.

However, Māturīdī makes it clear, in contradistinction to Ash'arī, that the act of man is his act in a real sense and not merely in a metaphorical way, while the Jabarīyah (Predeterminists) say that man does not act at all. If men acted only in a metaphorical sense, adds Māturīdī, that would undermine hope and fear. Maturīdī further points out that Abū Ḥanīfah has mediated between these two extremes by maintaining that creation is God's act, and this is the origination of the capacity but the use of that capacity is an act of the creature. The Ash'arites maintain, however, that the capacity for doing good is different from the capacity for doing evil and this is *Jabr* (Predeterminism), for if a man does not have the capacity to do both good and evil, he has no freedom left. Māturīdī further charges the Mu'tazilah with denying God's *Mashī'ah* (Will) on the basis of the Qur'ānic verse, "I have not created Jinn and man for aught except worship" (LI : 56), that is, God has not created them for *Kufr* (disbelief) and, therefore, He does not will disbelief in men. Māturīdī says

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that the meaning of this verse is that "I have not commanded them aught except to worship." Similarly, the Qur'ānic verse, "God does not will injustice for His creatures" (XL : 31) does not support the Mu'tazilah, for it means that God does not will that His creatures should be unjustly treated.

MU'TAZILĪ CONCEPTION OF A LIMITED GOD

To uphold man's freedom of will, the Mu'tazilah had to deny that God wills all the acts of men, good as well as evil, for they maintained that God cannot will the disobedient acts of men. In support of this, they quoted such verses as "God does not like disorder" (II : 205). But this was explained by the opponents of the Mu'tazilah to mean that God does not like good men to create disorder.[25] The Mu'tazilah maintained, on the other hand, that if God willed everything there was no point in condemning the polytheists for their disbelief, as the Qur'ān does in the verse, "Those who associate (other deities) with Him say that if God had willed, neither we nor our forefathers would have been guilty of such association" (XVI : 148). It was pointed out to them in explanation of the verse that such statements were made by the polytheists in order to refute the Prophets and their followers for saying, "If God had willed, He would have guided you (to the right path)" (X : 99). The Mu'tazilah, again, denied that God wills obscenities, for He has condemned those "who like obscenities to spread amongst the believers" (XXIV : 19). The reply given by Bāqillānī[26] is that God has condemned those who attribute to clean people that which they do not have and who think it right and proper that they should have such qualities. Similarly, God does not will that the calumniation of chaste women should be just and proper and He does not will what the clumniators will with regard to chaste women. Not only that, but God has also forbidden them to will such a thing.

Consistent with their idea of a just God, the Mu'tazilah held that God does not create *Kufr* or disbelief in men. For example, they quoted the Qur'ānic verse, "How do you disbelieve in God, when you were lifeless, then He caused you to live, then He will cause you to die, and again give you a new life, then you return to Him" (II : 27), and they argued that if God had created disbelief in them how could He rebuke them for disbelieving, just as God did not rebuke men for being black or white, healthy

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or diseased. Secondly, if God originally created them for damnation (*Shaqā'*) and He had intended for them nothing more than that they should be disbelievers and burn in fire, how was it possible that He should condemn them for disbelief, just as it is irrational that God, having prevented them from believing, should ask the question,[27] "what has prevented men from believing" (XVII : 93).

Owing to their rationalistic tendencies, the Mu'tazilah were unable to offer a satisfactory explanation of such Qur'ānic verses as that "God had sealed their hearts" (II : 6), and "But God impressed on their hearts their own disbelief so that they will not believe except a few of them" (IV : 154). Some of them said that this meant nothing except that God called them misguided and judged them to be disbelievers. Others explained that the meaning of "He misguided them" is that He caused them to perish, as we say in Arabic, "my camel lost its way or has perished" (ضللت بعيرى).[28] Ibn Ḥazm's comment on such interpretations is that they are empty claims unsupported by arguments.[29] Zamakhsharī, however, brings an argument in conformity with the general Mu'tazilah stand on human free-will. He says[30] that God's saying that He has impressed disbelief on their hearts should be read in conjunction with the declaration of the Jews that "our hearts are wrapped" by which they meant they were not responsible for their disbelief, since it was impossible for them to gain access to truth owing to the covering on their hearts. This, he says, is like the stand of those who believe in '*Jabr*' (Predeterminism). In reply to this, God told them that their hearts had been impressed with disbelief, because of their persistent refusal to accept truth and not because their hearts had been wrapped up from the beginning in such a way as to render them incapable of listening to truth.

As regard such verses as "If We had desired, We would have given every soul its guidance" (XXXII : 13), the Mu'tazilah interpretation was that the meaning here[31] is that if God had desired, He could have forced them to become believers by compulsion. Similarly, the verse "You cannot guide whom you want but God guides whom He wishes to guide" (XXXVIII : 56) was interpreted to mean that God had informed His Prophet in the verse that He had the power to force whomsoever He wanted into believing by compulsorily leading him towards belief.

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The Mu'tazilah stand that the acts of man are his own creation and not of God was further justified by such verses as "O ye, who believe, repent Ye towards God with a true repentance" (LXII : 7). Now repentance (*Tawbah*), they argued, is man's own creation, for if God had created it, He could not have asked it of His creatures. The opponents of the Mu'tazilah quoted another verse to refute them, that is, "Show us our modes of prayer and repent on us" (II : 127). They said[32] that the acts of men were created by God, otherwise if *Tawbah* (Repentance) had been created by man, Abraham's asking God to repent would be meaningless. The Mu'tazilah equated the *Tawbah* in this case with *Tawfīq* (Grace of God) or the acceptance of the *Tawbah* by God. Commenting on this interpretation of the Mu'tazilah, Nāṣir al-Dīn Aḥmad bin Maḥmūd (d. 683 A.H.) says[33] :—

"The Qadarīyah imagine that the creature had created the *Tawbah* for himself out of his own power. But according to the *Ahl al-Sunnah*, obedience has been created by God so that He may reward the creature and, similarly, He has created the *Tawbah* for the creature and accepted it from him."

The Mu'tazilah tendency to limit God's power found expression also in other spheres of thought. For example, they thought that God is obligated to do certain things for man. Thus, in commenting on the Qur'ānic verse "The *Tawbah* (Repentance) is upon God for those persons who commit evil in ignorance, then they repent soon" (IV : 16), Zamakhsharī[34] says that the acceptance of repentance from such a man is obligatory on God. But Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd[35] points out that in expressing such an opinion, Zamakhsharī is thinking of God as if He were modelled on man, because just as man is obligated to do certain acts of obedience towards God, God is, similarly, obligated to accept his repentance which tends to establish a spurious resemblance between the creator and the creature. Rāzī's argument[36] in support of the stand of the *Ahl al-Sunnah* is that if God had not created in man a tendency towards repentance, man could not have repented of himself. Therefore, repentance is from God, not from man.

The same trend of thought leads the Mu'tazilah to believe that God cannot lay a greater burden on man than he can bear. Proof of this stand is found in the Qur'ānic verse "God does not burden a soul except to the extent of its capacity" (II : 286). Zamakhsharī[37] says that this verse establishes the two attributes of

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God's Justice and Mercy and He connects it with another verse "God intends to make things easier for you" (II : 184). He further points to the fact that it was within man's power to pray more than five times a day and fast for more than a month. But that He did not place such a burden on man shows His sense of justice. Thus the idea of a just but limited God is upheld by the Mu'tazilah on the basis of the Qur'ānic verses. Bāqillānī, however, who was the man next to Ash'arī himself in the building of Asha'rite theology, says that[38] this verse of the Qur'ān regarding man's power and capacity does not affirm man's power before his act but means that God has not obliged man to give to his wives by way of sustenance (*nafaqāt*) more than he is able to earn. He goes on to refer to the Qur'ānic verse "And upon those who can afford, there is the obligation to feed a poor man" (II : 180). If it is asked, he says, whether this verse does not show God's placing upon man only that much burden which he can bear, the reply is that this verse means that upon those who have the necessary means to feed a poor man but do not have the strength to fast, there is *fidyah*. But, adds Bāqillānī, the verse has nothing to do whatsoever with man's power or God's obligation to do only that which is good or just for man and which he can bear. In support of his argument, Bāqillānī further quotes the verse "And they had not in their power to hear" (XVIII : 101) where hearing means accepting. The verse, he says, refers to the disbelievers who had no power to accept the message of God and His Prophet. Another verse quoted by Bāqillānī is "You shall not have power to do justice between women, even if you were so minded" (IV : 128—129). In spite of this, when God commands us to do justice to our wives, it shows conclusively that God can ask something from man which is beyond his power or capacity. In general, therefore, the Asha'rites admitted no limitation of God's power.

Ibn Taymīyah's comments on the Asha'rite stand with regard to God's will in contrast with those of the Mu'tazilah are interesting. He accuses[39] the Asha'rites of denying the wisdom (*Ḥikmah*) of God and says that they affirm a Divine will which is devoid of Love, Mercy, and Approbation. In this way, says Ibn Taymīyah, the Ash'arites make all creatures equal in relation to God's promise and threat. He adds that, although the Mu'tazilah were led astray on the question of *Qadr* (Determination by God), they insisted, at

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least, on command and prohibition. They were wrong, however, in thinking that if they affirmed an all-inclusive Divine will, this would compromise the justice and wisdom of God. On the other hand, some of the *Ahl al-Kalām*, a section of the Ṣufīs and a group of religious scholars, although they affirmed *Qadr* (Determination by God) and believed that whatever happened, happened by God's will, fell short in the matter of command, and prohibition, promise and threat. The main thing, insists Ibn Taymīyah, is that he who affirms *Qadr* (Determination by God) and proceeds therefrom to argue that there is no such thing as command, and prohibition is in a worse position than he who denies *Qadr* but affirms command and prohibition. For, he who argues from *Qadr* to establish the presence of a universal Providence and does not distinguish between that which is commanded and that which is prohibited, between a believer and a disbeliever, between those who obey and those who disobey God, does not really believe in any of the Prophets, nor any portion of God's Books, and according to him, Adam is at a par with Satan, Noah with his nation and Moses with Pharaoh, Similarly, in the eyes of such a person those who embraced Islam in the early stages of the Prophet's preachings hold the same position with the non-believers.

THE PROBLEM OF *RŪ'YAH* (PHYSICAL PERCEPTION) OF GOD

In applying their logic to theological matters, the Mu'tazilah were led to deny that God could be physically perceived by man either in this world or in the Hereafter. They argued from the Qur'ānic verse, "Sight shall not perceive Him but He shall perceive the sights" (VI : 103). Similarly, they quoted the verse, "The people of the book ask thee that thou shouldst cause to descend on them a book from heaven. They asked Moses for something greater than this, when they said, show us God openly" (IV : 152). Again, they referred to God's reply to Moses, "Thou shalt not see me" (VII : 139—143) when Moses desired that God should show Himself to him. Another argument brought forward by the Mu'tazilah from the Qur'ān was that when God did make His appearance before Moses, the mountain on which he stood was smashed to pieces (VII : 139—143) which shows that Moses could not look at God. Bāqillānī's[40] argument against the Mu'tazilah is that God has power to stop certain things from being seen by creating something which is preventive of its perception.

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This is a power, says Bāqillāni, which He possesses from Eternity unchangingly. But by removing the obstacle which prevents the perception of such things, He can render it perceptible to our eyes. God, for example describes himself as one who makes things live and causes them to die, though He could not be described as making them live and causing them to die before the creation of the world. So, it is quite possible that a certain thing described about God by Himself may be negated by a further act of His own. In the same way, when He says that sights shall not perceive Him, this description of Himself by Himself may lapse, if He chooses to remove the obstacles to His perception.

In denying that God is perceptible to the human eye even in the Hereafter, the Mu'tazilah argued from the Qur'ānic verse, "Sight shall not perceive Him, but He shall perceive sights" (VI : 103) and said that the verse has a general sense, because it covers both the imperceptibility of God in this world and His imperceptibility in the Hereafter. Asha'rī's reply[41] to the Mu'tazilah is that perception is of two kinds, perception by sight and perception by the heart (understanding) as shown by the Qur'ānic verse, "Sights are not blinded but it is the hearts within the human breasts that are blinded." Therefore, the Mu'tazilah argument, specially because it insists on the verse being applicable both to the life here and the life Hereafter, makes God incapable of being perceived either by sight or by understanding in either world, a position which is absurd on its face. Ash'arī rests his argument on the use made of the word '*Baṣr*' in Arabic and says that in the Arabic language, this word is used commonly for understanding, as we say (فلانٌ بصيرٌ بضاعته) "such and such a man is capable of understanding or judging his own handicraft." Ash'arī proceeds to argue that if the Mu'tazilah maintain that the impossibility of his being perceived here and in the hereafter does not exclude his being seen by our hearts (understanding), and that it means only that our hearts cannot perceive Him, our reply would be that the Mu'tazilah would not be justified, on their own argument, in denying that He can be seen by the sight of the eye and that this does not necessarily imply His being perceived, because our seeing Him by our hearts or eyes does not constitute perception. Again, if the Mu'tazilah reply that perception of God means His knowledge, then God's saying that He perceives sights means that He knows them and, similarly, His saying that sights cannot perceive Him,

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means that sights cannot know Him. But if this is the position, adds Ash'arī, then it is clear that the denial of God's knowledge on the part of man is not the same thing as the claim that man cannot perceive Him by his physical sight.

SOME METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS AND THE QUR'ĀNIC ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Sometimes the Mu'tazilah supported their metaphysics by arguments derived from the Qur'ān. For example, they maintained that God is present in every place and referred to the Qur'ānic verse, "He is the God (*Ilāh*) in the heavens and in the earth too, He is God (*Ilāh*)" (XLIII : 83). Commenting on this argument, Māturīdī of Samarqand says[42] that this is not an argument which supports the position of the Mu'tazilah, since it signifies only the permeation of the Divine Being in the heavens and the earth, which he says, we hold to be true, but the stand of the Mu'tazilah and the Qadarīyah in this respect is much worse than that of the *Mushabbihah* (Anthropomorphists), since it leads to the position that God is present in the bellies of the wild beasts and those of the insects. Similarly, the Mu'tazilah supported their metaphysical doctrine that the non-existent is a thing (that is, a positive entity) by referring to the Qur'ānic verse, "The quaking of the Last Day is a great thing" (XXII : 1). Since the quaking of the Last Day was something which did not exist and still God called it a great thing, it proved, they argued, that the non-existent is a positive entity. About this the author of *Sharḥ Fiqh al-Akbar* says[43] that the quaking of the Last Day will be a thing in its own time, when it comes into being. It does not mean that God has called it a 'thing' now, in the present.

Similarly, Abu 'l-Hudhayl argued that[44] for originated things there was a whole and a totality so that knowledge of them and power over them reached a point of exhaustion. But the uncreated had neither a limit nor a point of exhaustion, so that there was no whole for it, neither had it got a totality. He supported his arguments from the Qur'ānic verse, "God is powerful over all things" (XVI : 76). "He has numbered everything in number" (LXXII : 28). All these verses prove, according to Abu 'l-Hudhayl, that things can be summed up in a whole, that God claims for Himself their full knowledge and that He is able to encompass them. The counting of *all* things and their encompassing, adds

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Abu 'l-Hudhayl, cannot be a reality except for that which is limited.

Abu 'l-Hudhayl further argued[45] that the knowledge of God is God. This philosophical stand was directed against the Rāfiḍah who believed that God is a knower with a knowledge which is originated. The Qur'ānic verse which he quoted in support of this argument was, "He has revealed it with His knowledge" (IV : 166), so that God is a knower in Himself. He found support in the opinion said to have been held by a large number of Muslims that the face of God is God. His argument was derived from the Qur'ānic verse, "We feed for God's face (God's sake)" (LXXVI : 9). It is obviously wrong to say, according to Abu 'l-Hudhayl, that God has a face with parts, so that there remains no other explanation for this verse, except to say that God's face is God. Similarly, we can say that God's knowledge is God.

SOME POLITICAL AND JURISTIC PROBLEMS

In their political theory too, the Mu'tazilah tried to interpret the Qur'ān in their own way. For example, they believed that it was incumbent on the Muslims to fight for upholding justice and to resort to armed conflict to remove injustice, if they had sufficient means. In support of this, they quoted the verse of the Qur'ān which says, "Co-operate in matters of virtue but do not co-operate in matters of evil-doing and tyranny" (V : 2). "Fight the group which rebels until the matter reverts to God" (XLIX : 9) and "My covenant does not apply to oppressors" (II : 142). Zamakhsharī,[46] a leading Mu'tazilah commentator of the Qur'ān, says about the verse, "Obey God and obey the Prophet and those in authority over you, but if you quarrel concerning any matter, revert to God and His Prophet" (IV : 58) that this verse does not necessarily signify absolute obedience to the rulers, for the rulers have been enjoined to discharge their trusts faithfully and observe strict justice in deciding matters. This means that if they fail to live up to these two divine injunctions ordained upon them, they lose the qualities which bring them within the meaning of the Qur'ānic phrase "Those in authority over you". Another reason, according to Zamakhsharī, for denying obedience to unjust rulers, is that they do not revert to God and His Prophet in their differences with the people. The Mu'tazilah stand on this issue does not seem to be wide of the mark, provided it is understood that we cannot

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and ought not to judge rulers according to the standards set by the Prophet himself and the first four Caliphs, and that some allowance must be made for the fact that there is bound to remain a certain gap between the ideal and the actual. Only this gap should not be too wide.

In regard to the more specific commandments of the Qur'ān, we get some interesting comments in Zamakhsharī. For example in explaining the verse,[47] "Marry from among women you like, two, three or four, but if you fear that you will not do justice to them, then keep to one or those whom your right hand owns. This is more proper if you are not to incline too much towards one of them" (IV : 3), Zamakhsharī refers to Shāfi'ī's interpretation that ألاّ تعولوا here means "Do not multiply your children". The reason, he says, is that a person who has got many children will find it difficult to observe the limits imposed upon man by piety, and the obligation to acquire lawful means of living. Zamakhsharī adds that if it is asked as to what is the position of those who own slave-girls, the reply is that the object of marriage is procreation, which is not the object in the case of keeping slave-girls. This is proved by the fact that *'Azl* is permitted in the case of slave-girls without any obligation to obtain their permission, while in the case of a wife, her permission for *'Azl* is necessary.

CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the Mu'tazilī thinking on theological matters threatened to sacrifice religious interests to speculative consistency. What the Mu'tazilah ignored was that religion, as a system of faith and morals, is not amenable to purely discursive reasoning and metaphysics, because the motivations of the two are entirely different. This is not to say that religion does not and should not employ reasoning or that the latter is totally inconsistent with religion. But the reason on which religion is based is much deeper as well as far more comprehensive than that employed by philosophy. Again, while religion is the attempt of man to get himself adjusted to the total reality, philosophy is concerned mostly with an intellectual understanding of the universe and of the nature of life in it. There have been some philosophical systems, no doubt, like Stoicism, which became organised ways of living and thus transformed themselves into a kind of religion, but their perception of life and reality

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was not deep enough to satisfy the religious craving of men. It is only the revealed religions in which man's urge for moral living has been fully satisfied, because their perception of reality is far deeper. But in giving articulated expression to their view of reality, they had to brush aside the search for superficial consistency which has been the chief characteristic of philosophy and metaphysics. The reason is that reality is far too vast and far too deep to be brought within the narrow framework of logical consistency. Hence, there will always remain some degree of variance between the reasoning used by philosophy and the one employed by religion.

In their theology, the Mu'tazilah were too much preoccupied with the idea of Divine justice and the desire to avoid the imputation of evil to God. What they overlooked was that good and evil, justice and injustice are ideas which arise in relation to human beings, that is, in a world of multiplicity. Where conflicting claims are to be adjusted and the rights of a particular man or a particular group are affected by the conduct of another man or group of men, the problem of good and evil takes concrete shape. But God is above all these categories and transcends all relationship in the merely human sense of the word. He is the unity of all multiplicity. No claims can be advanced against God by any of His creatures. Therefore, He is above all good and evil, justice and injustice. There is nothing good in relation to Him and nothing evil. The charge of the *Ahl al-Sunnah* against the Mu'tazilah that they were tending towards belief in two Gods, one who creates good only and the other, creator of evil, was not without foundation. If certain things spring into existence without God willing them, there must exist another will besides that of God and of equal power to bring them into existence. On the other hand, if we think that because God wills everything, good as well as evil, belief as well as disbelief, we need not make a distinction between what He merely wills, in the sense that He permits its existence for some deeper reason, and what He *actively* approves of, then there is a danger that the distinction between good and evil, Islam and non-Islam, may be obliterated. Therefore, a line must be drawn dividing God's will (*Mashī'ah*) and His approbation (*Riḍā'*). If the Mu'tazilah had stressed only the approbative aspect of God's will as against its permissive aspect, they might have received greater acceptance, but they denied God's willing anything save

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what was good. However, in laying stress on what God wishes us to bring about through His commands and prohibitions as against what He suffers merely to exist, they did some good, as Ibn Taymīyah frankly acknowledged. It is regrettable that this active, approbative and reprobative aspect of the Divine will did not receive greater emphasis in later Muslim thought.

The Mu'tazilah belief that God is obligated to do only what is good for man places limitations on His power from which man's religious consciousness recoils. It is another thing that God usually wills what is good for man. But that is an aspect of His Mercy which overshadows everything else. There is nothing, however, to debar Him from doing the contrary, if He so desires.

The Qur'ānic arguments adduced by the Mu'tazilah to justify their metaphysical notions leave us unimpressed. For the Qur'ān is not a book either of philosophy or of logic. It attempts to rouse in us a sense both of righteousness and of Divine majesty and power without any effort to present a philosophically formulated system of thought. That the Qur'ān calls upon man to exercise his reason is true. But that the reason on which it lays so much stress is discursive or formulative which seeks to build up a fully coherent system of thought, is far from true. It cannot be denied that the Qur'ān has appealed to consistency as a proof of its veracity, as in the verse, "If it had been from any other source, besides God, you might have found many inconsistencies therein" (IV : 81). The consistency here appealed to, however, is not the superficial consistency of metaphysics, but the consistency of the moral teachings contained in the Qur'ān. To look for man-made logic and metaphysics in a Book the main purpose of which is to rouse the religious and moral consciousness of man is to misunderstand the purpose of religion itself.

When we come to the stand of the Mu'tazilah on the issues of moral conduct, we find again that their thought is marred by certain excesses. For example, their hard and fast distinction between a *mu'min*, a *munāfiq* and a *fāsiq* is difficult to accept. There can only be one rigid classification with regard to men. It is of those who identify themselves politically and religiously with the Muslim community and those who do not. Among those who do, there may be all shades and grades of men in respect of moral and spiritual purity. But whatever the degree of their divergence with the accepted moral standards of the community, they shall

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still be treated as Muslims insofar as this world is concerned and, as for the Hereafter, their case rests with God, who is in a far better position to judge them.

NOTES

1. Isfrā'īnī, *Al-Tabṣīr fī 'l-Dīn*, Cairo and Baghdād 1374 A.H., p. 6.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
3. Al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, Cairo 1367 A.H., p. 71.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
5. Ibn Ḥazm, *Kitāb-al Fiṣal fī 'l-Milal wa 'l-Ahwā' wa 'l-Naḥl*, Cairo 1321 A.H., p. 171.
6. Fazlur Rahman, Concepts *Sunnah*, *Ijtihād* and *Ijmā'* in the Early Period, in *Islamic Studies*, Karachi, vol. I, No, 1 (March, 1962), p. 9.
7. Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 17 and notes given below.
8. Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, vol. II, Cairo 1369 A.H., p, 157.
9. Ash'arī, *Ibid.*, p. 158.
10. Abū Manṣūr Maturīdī, *Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, Hyderabad (Ind.) 1367 A.H., pp. 16-17.
11. Abū Ḥanīfah, *Kitāb al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, Hyderabad (Ind.) 1373 A.H., p. 1.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
14. Abū 'l-Ḥusayn b. 'Uthmān al-Khayyāt Mu'tazilī, *Kitāb al-Intiṣār*, Beirut, 1957, pp. 118-19.
15. Rāzī, *Mafātiḥ al-Ghayb*, vol. I, Cairo, 1308 A.H., p. 392.
16. Rāzī, *Ibid.*, p. 394.
17. Rāzī, *Ibid.*, p. 394.
18. Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, vol. I, Cairo, 1354 A.H., pp. 272-73.
19. Rāzī, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-41.
20. Zamakhsharī, *op. cit.*, p. 290-91.
21. Shahrastānī, *Al-Milal wa 'l-Naḥl*. vol. I, Cairo 1910, p. 108.
22. Ibn Ḥazam, *Fiṣal, op. cit.*, vol. III, Cairo 1910, p. 48, 49.
23. Rāzī, *op. cit.*, p. 432.
24. Māturīdī, *Rilsālah fi 'l-'Aqā'id*, Istanbul, pp. 12-3.
25. Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd*, Beirut, 1957, p. 284,
26. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
27. Rāzī, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
28. Ibn Ḥazm, *op. cit.*, p. 49,
29. Zamakhsharī, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
30. al-Mu'tazilī, *op, cit.*, p. 89, 90.
31. Rāzī, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 118-19.
32. Nāṣir al-Dīn Aḥmād b. Maḥmūd, *Kitāb a-Intiṣāf*, Cairo, 1354 A.H., p. 256.
33. Zamakhsharī, *op. cit.*, pp. 256, 257.
34. Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
35. Rāzī, *op. cit.*, p. 492.
36. Zamakhsharī, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

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37. Bāqillānī, *op cit.*, pp. 291-94.
38. Ibn Taymīyah, *Majmū'ah Rasā'il*, vol. V, Cairo 1349, pp. 126-28.
39. Bāqillanī, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-70.
40. Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-8.
41. Māturīdī, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Al-Mu'tazīlī, *op. cit*, pp. 16-7.
44. *Ibid*, pp. 59-60.
45. Zamakhsharī, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

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